

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ABU DH 00701 031200Z

44

ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 SAB-01 OMB-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /078 W

----- 085571

R 030830Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2768

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 0701

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, TC

SUBJ: SHAIKH ZAYID'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF KISSINGER MISSION

1. I HAD MEETING MARCH 29 WITH SHAIKH ZAYID, FIRST CHANCE I HAVE HAD TO CALL ON HIM SINCE HIS RETURN FROM PAKISTAN. WE TALKED FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS. HIS YOUNG COUSIN SHAIKH SUROOR WAS PRESENT, AND TOWARD END OF MEETING FOREIGN MINISTER SUWAIDI JOINED US. SHAIKH ZAYID SEEMED IN GOOD HEALTH, SELF-ASSURED AND RELAXED, ALTHOUGH SOBERED BY KINGFAISAL'S ASSASSINATION. VULNERABILITY OF ANY CHIEF OF STATE WHO IS ACCESSIBLE TO PUBLIC (AS ZAYID MAKES A POINT OF BEING) COULD NOT HAVE BEEN FAR FROM HIS THOUGHTS.

2. GOOD PART OF CONVERSATION WAS ON ARAB-ISRAEL SITUATION. ZAYID OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING AFTER PRESCRIBED RITUAL OF ASKING EAVYH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ABU DH 00701 031200Z

OTHER REPEATEDLY HOW WE WERE, THAT, PRAISE GOD, HE WAS FINE, BUT

TWO THINGS WEREN'T FINE: "KING FAISAL'S MURDER AND FAILURE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEGOTIATIONS". WE THEN TALKED ABOUT SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA DN OTHER MATTERS BEFORE RETURNING TO ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER GROUND IN JERUSALEM 658 DIRECTLY WITH ZAYID, EVEN THOUGH I ASSUMED SUWAIDI HAD ALREADY CONVEYED GIST OF THAT MESSAGE TO HI. I STRESSED THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO HELP PARTIES MOVE TOWARD PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS UNDIMINISHED AND THAT WE REMAINED READY TO HELP THEM IN ANY WAY THEY WISHES.

3. ZAYID DREW THOUGHTFUL BREATH AFTER MY REMARKS AND THEN SAID HE WISHED TO BE QUITE FRANK. ISRAEL'S VERY EXISTENCE DEPENDED ON US SUPPORT. THIS WAS NOT MERELY SUBJECTIVE VIEW OF ARABS BUT RERMGNIZED FACT BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN SPITE OF THIS, ARABS HAD TRIED HARD TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US OVER THE YEARS. THIS WAS BECAUSE ARABS RECOGNIZE AMERICA'S POWER, ITS TECHNOLOGICAL SUPER- IORITY, AND ITS MORAL QUALITIES. ARABS BELIEVED AMERICA'S SENSE OF JUSTICE WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD IT TO POLICY OF FAIRNESS ON ARAB- ISRAEL PROBLEM. BUT UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENJOY THIS DOUBLE ADVANTAGE INDEFINITELY.

4. US COULD NOT, CONTINUED ZAYID, NOW EVADE RESPONSIBILITY BY SAYING "IT IS UP TO PARTIES TO DECIDE HOW THEY WANT TO PROCEED." ISRAEL WAS BEING STUBBORN, AND IT WAS US SUPPORT THAT WAS ENABLING IT TO BE STUBBORN. US HAD ON OCCASION CRITICIZED ISRAEL IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT THEN CONGSNUED TO GIVE ISRAEL WHAT IT WANTED ANYWAY. IT WAS TIME TO BEGIN TRANSLATING THESE WORDS INTO DEEDS.

5. SHAIKH ZAYID SAID US SHOULD RECOGNIZE ARABS WERE NOT ASKING FOR CONQUESTS, "ONLY THEIR RIGHTS". HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED, HE SAID, THAT US HAD FAILED IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH INVOLVED EGYPT, MOST REASONABLE AND MODERATE OF ARAB STATES. IF WE COULD NOT SUCCEED IN TALKING REASON INTO ISRAEL IN SUCH LIMITED ENDEAVOR, WHAT HOPE WAS THERE FOR SOLVING MORE COMPLICATED ASPECTS OF CONFLICT?

6. SHAIKH ZAYID SAID US SOMETIMES SEEMED OBLIVIOUS TO ITS OWN INTERESTS. TRANSFORMATION OF EGYPT FROM "ARMED CAMP" INTO STATE WITH MODERATE, SENSIBLE POLICIES UNDER SADAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY ASSET FOR US INTERESTS. WAS US CONTENT TO SEE ALL THIS GO OUT THE WINDOW?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ABU DH 00701 031200Z

7. ZAYID'S REMARKS WERE IN FACT GOOD DEAL MORE RAMBLING THAN THIS, WITH MANY DIGRESSIONS AND REPETITIONS, BUT PARAGRAPHS ABOVE REFLECT GIST AND FLAVOR OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY. HIS MANNER WAS FORTHRIGHT BUT NOT ANGRY OR UPSET. I INTERVENED ON TWO OCCASIONS: ONCE, WHEN TENOR OF HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTED THAT WE HAD MERELY TO ORDER ISRAEL OUT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS PROVIDED BROAD PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT THEY WERE NOT SELF-IMPLEMENTING.

NEGOTIATIONS WERE REQUIRED BETWEEN PARTIES AND INDEED VERY IMPORTANT MATTERS HAD TO BE SPELLED OUT IN NEGOTIATIONS.

8. MY SECOND COMMENT WAS IN RESPONSE TO ZAYID'S QUERY (NOT EXPRESSED QUITE SO BLUNTLY), AS TO WHY WE CONTINUED TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH ARMS AND MONEY WHEN IT WAS UNRESPONSIVE TO USG'S WISHES. I TOLD SHAIKH ZAYID THAT THE 1967 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WHICH ARABS AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACCEPTED, CALLED FOR A SECURE, RECOGNIZED ISRAEL WITHIN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. THERE WAS ONLY ONE POWER IN WORLD WILLING TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO THAT RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH SUPPORT IT NEEDED TO ASSURE ITS SECURITY WITHIN CONTEXT OF UN RESOLUTIONS--AND THAT WAS THE US. BUT THIS PRESENTED US WITH CONSTANT POLICY DILEMMA, FOR IF ISRAEL WAS TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO ASSURE ITS BASIC SECURITY IN FACE OF HEAVILY ARMED ADVERSARIES IT WOULD ALSO INEVITABLY BE STRONG ENOUGH TO HAVE A WILL OF ITS OWN.

9. ZAYID CONCLUDED THIS PART OF CONVERSATION ON GENIAL NOTE. HE SAID HE HAD TRIED TO BE FRANK BUT "FRANKNESS WAS ONLY POSSIBLE BETWEEN FRIENDS." I RECIPROCATED THIS SENTIMENT AND PROMISED SHAIKH ZAYID THAT I WOULD CONVEY HIS VIEWS FULLY TO WASHINGTON.  
STERNER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PERSONAL OPINION, ARBITRATION, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE TALKS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 03 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975ABUDH00701  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750115-0094  
**From:** ABU DHABI  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750487/aaaadbeq.tel  
**Line Count:** 137  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 20 JUN 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <20 JUN 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <05 SEP 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SHAIKH ZAYID'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF KISSINGER MISSION  
**TAGS:** PFOR, SA, TC, XF, US, (ZAYID, IBN SULTAN)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006